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1.  INTRODUCTION. ET RELIABILITY 
 
Steam generator (SG) tube integrity is of great importance for safe and reliable nuclear power plant 
(NPP)  operation.  The  application  of  eddy  current  testing  (ET)  to  evaluate  SG  tube  integrity  is 
recognized worldwide and has been used over several decades. However, at times, ET results are 
considered questionable. 
A decision to leave a defective SG tube in operation is made based on the ET results acquired. 
The reliability of ET can be expressed by the following equation [1, 2, 3]: 
( ) ( ) ( ) HF h AP g IC f R − − = , 
where R - total reliability of the ET system; f(IC) - intrinsic capability of the system driven by physical 
laws and technical potential, generally considered as an ideal upper bound; g(AP) - the effect of an 
application parameter, such as ET system-specified parameters and conditions of ET performance; and 
h(HF) - the effect of human factors. In many cases, the human factor parameter h(HF) cannot be 
separated from g(AP) because h(HF) is included as a part of the effect of the application parameter. 
This paper describes several available methodologies for obtaining numerical values with which 
to directly estimate the effect of human factors on ET reliability. We investigated the possibility of 
applying available approaches for estimating the human factor effect by applying two methodologies 
[4, 5] to the issue of ET reliability. 
 
 
2.  HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS TASK DEFINITION 
 
To estimate the effect of the human factor in ET reliability, we applied the Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA)  methodology.The  aim  of  HRA  is  the  quantification  of  human  error  probability.  The 
methodology usually is used to evaluate human reliability of NPP operations personnel. Typically, 
HRA is incorporated into the PRA model. The main requirement for an HRA assessment is that results 
be documented sufficiently well according to all assumptions defined to enable their replicability in 
subsequent assessments. 
Human Reliability Analysis (or Human Factor Analysis) is the characterization of relationships 
between personnel (in our case, technical personnel performing ET of SG heat exchanger tubes during 
an NPP outage) and reactor unit systems and analysis of effects on system reliability resulting from 
such interaction. 
Personnel  actions  include  any  activity,  such  as  direct  performance  of  operations,  decision 
making, or mental activity, performed individually or collectively by NPP personnel, that affect NPP 
operational  status  (for  example,  equipment  stage,  systems  configuration).  The  result  of  personnel 
action performance can be either success or failure (personnel error). And personnel error is a basic 
event that introduces mistakes during the performance of needed action—mistakes that lead to failure 
of safety functions, systems, or equipment. 
In addition, the HRA methodology has general assumptions and limitations [6]. Those specific 
to NDT include the following: 
1.  Only  personnel  errors  that  occurred  during  performance  of  definite  tasks  by  personnel  are 
considered. 
2.  It is assumed that NDE personnel are acting in the best interests of the NPP. 
3.  The NPP unit is shut down for maintenance. Operator stress level is normal. 
4.  Tasks are performed by competent, qualified NPP personnel with at least 6 months’ experience 
in their respective positions.  
In  our  research,  the  subjects  were  maintenance  personnel,  specifically  those  personnel 
performing ET of SG heat exchanger tubes.  According to [4, 5], errors stemming from manual actions 
rather than from the decision-making process are more typical for this type of staff. 
 
 
3.  DESCRIPTION OF METHOD 
 
Conducting an HRA includes performance of several tasks. In accordance with [7] and taking into 
account our area of research, these tasks contain the following items [8] (see Fig. 1): 
1.  Familiarization with NPP and data acquisition and identification of personnel actions; 
2.  Selection of more important (essential) events, errors, actions; 
3.  Performance of detailed analysis after selection of actions for this detailed analysis.  At this step, 
the action (event) is defined in more detail; methodology for quantity assessment is selected; 
quantity analysis (i.e., data acquisition for quantity assessment) is conducted; 
4.  Quantification of analysis (calculation of errors probability); 
5.  Documentation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Systematic analysis of human error applied to ET of steam generator heat exchanger tube 
performance 
 
 
4.  METHOD APPLICATION 
 
After familiarization with actions performed by NDE operators during eddy-current inspection of SG 
heat exchanger  tubes, a  list  of  actions  conducted  was  developed.  Actions  performed  by  staff  but 
without ET system effect were selected. At the next step, the most important and essential events, 
errors, and actions were screened. All actions were found to need more detailed analysis. To perform 
quantitative estimation, the methodology for quantification was selected. 
Currently,  no  models  of  personnel  behavior  can  describe  human  behavior  in  detail  and 
consistently, nor can they present a precise definition of reliability parameters.  Therefore, methods of 
HRA quantification take into account a limited number of aspects of personnel behavior, and it is 
assumed that these aspects have the most important impact on human reliability. 
In our work, we selected two methodologies for HRA quantification: 
1.  ASEP [5]; 
2.  Decision Tree Approach [9]. 
Of the two methodologies, ASEP—Accident Sequence Evaluation Program Human Reliability 
Analysis  Procedure—is  more  conservative.  It  is  less  time-consuming  and  has  a  procedure  for 
screening. This screening procedure permits more attention to be focused on detailed analysis of the 
most important human errors. 
The Decision Tree Approach is a more detailed methodology that uses data specified for our 
concrete case based on expert judgments.  
4.1  ASEP Methodology  
 
Taking into account that basic human error probability (HEP) consists of errors of omission and errors 
of commission [5], it is assigned a total basic HEP for each critical action: 
∑ ∑ ∑ + = com omis HEP HEP HEP . 
Based on [5], we assumed that a basic HEP for each error of omission is equal to 0,02 and a 
basic HEP for each error of commission is equal to 0,01. Therefore, for each critical action, the full 
basic HEP is equal to 0,03.  This value is conservative, and suggests that NDT staff at an NPP must 
not be very well qualified if the basic HEPs were to be increased. It is assumed to apply error of 
omission  and  error  of  commission  as  the  same  value  with  HEP  =  0,03.  According  to  ASEP 
methodology, the final value of HEP must be derived by multiplying the basic HEP on recovery 
factors. 
Four critical actions are performed by NDE operator-analysts who interpret ET results. In our 
study, two optimum conditions can be applied, according to the procedure for performing ET of steam 
generator heat exchanger tubes at NPPs of Ukraine. These conditions and their associated recovery 
factors are as follows: 
-  direct performance of ET by a second person to check correctness of ET analysis performed by 
the first operator. The HEP for this recovery factor is equal to 0,1. 
-  performance of inspection of another physical nature after ET completion. The HEP for this 
recovery factor is equal to 0,01. 
These two recovery factors reduce the HEP for the activity. Finally, quantitative assessment of 
human reliability analysis has the following form: 
00012 , 0 01 , 0 1 , 0 4 03 , 0 ∑ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = analytic HEP . 
So, the most conservative assessment of HEP for ET results interpretation is 12 x 10
-5. 
Because ET of SG heat exchanging tubes is performed by two types of staff (ET data acquisition 
and ET results interpretation), we also apply the ASEP methodology to operators who performed ET 
data acquisition. There are four critical actions performed by these NDE operators as well. In addition, 
a  recovery  factor  that  involves  performance  testing  of  ET  data  acquisition  (HEP  =  0,01)  can  be 
applied. Finally, the HEP for staff performing ET data acquisition is the following: 
0012 , 0 01 , 0 4 03 , 0 _ ∑ = ⋅ ⋅ = acq data HEP . 
And the total HEP of personnel performing SG heat exchanger tubes ET is equal: 
00132 , 0 0012 , 0 00012 , 0 = + = ET HEP . 
 
 
4.2  Decision Tree Approach 
 
The decision tree approach to human error analysis requires performing an investigation dealing with 
all factors (such as time limitations, stress level, knowledge level, experience) that affect operator 
actions.  The  graphical  form  of  these  factors  (as  a  “tree”)  is  constructed,  and  such  representation 
enables the making of justified conclusions corresponding to the most risk significant factors, and, at 
the end, human error reliability will be quantified (“decision” will be achieved). 
The main components of the decision tree are  
1.  headings or performance shaping factors arranged in order of decreasing significance; 
2.  logical structure that consists of many branches corresponding to possible values of performance 
shaping factors; 
3.  probabilities that correspond to end states. 
The basic task one must apply when using the decision tree approach include 1) identification of 
performance  shaping  factors  (headings)  and  their  order  of  location  in  the  decision  tree;  2) 
identification  of  possible  values  of  performance  shaping  factors  (branches  of  decision  tree),  i.e., 
logical structure; and 3) identification of probabilities that correspond to decision tree end states.  
Experienced NPP expert operators were used when completing the tasks listed above. First, an 
ET expert was interviewed and a full list of performance shaping factors (PSFs) was prepared as a 
result  of  this  interview.  This  list  consists  of  14  factors  for  operators-analysts  and  9  factors  for 
operators who perform an acquisition of ET data. Based on results of this interview, two different 
questionnaires for two types of ET personnel, namely, ET data acquisition and ET results analysis, 
were prepared. These questionnaires include all PSFs. 
At the second step, a preliminary decision tree was developed based on expert judgment of this 
experienced operator. A logical structure with two to three branches for each PSF with specified 
qualitative assessments of each branch was developed as well. It was decided to develop a decreasing 
decision tree. 
The next step involved conducting a personal interview according to questionnaires with each 
participant of these two groups. We asked operators to define the order of risk-significance for these 
PSFs in a decreasing direction. It was assigned that worst qualitative assessment of each PSF is 1, and 
operators were asked to define a quantitative value of best qualitative assessment for each PSF that 
must be less than 1 (but more than 0). A middle value of PSF (if any), was assigned as the average 
value between best and worst values. Interviews were conducted with eight operators-analysts and 
nine operators who acquire ET data. 
Next was development of the final decision tree. First, all decision tree headings (PSFs) were 
classified according to judgments of experts. Two different decision trees for operators-analysts and 
one decision tree for operators that acquire ET data were developed. 
In  the  first  case  for  operators-analysts,  the  order  of  PSFs  defined  by  one  main  expert  was 
accepted as the order of headings in the decision tree. At the next stage, the last four factors from this 
arranged list were delayed so they have very small significant effect on operator actions.  Based on 
that, quantitative assessments for each branch for each PSF of the decision tree were calculated as the 
average between corresponding values for the entire group except for the values of the main expert.  In 
this way, values for the intermediate decision tree were established. Then final probabilities for each 
branch of PSFs were quantified as averages corresponding to the values assigned by main experts and 
values from the intermediate decision tree. 
In the second case for operators-analysts, three of the best-experienced experts were selected 
from the group of operators questionnaires. In this case, the specific order of decision tree headings 
was defined as the average between orders specified by main experts selected. As in the previous case, 
last  4  factors  so  they  have  very  small  significant  and  effect  on  operator  actions  were  delayed. 
Quantifications  of  probabilities  for  each  branch  of  PSFs  were  calculated  as  an  average  between 
corresponding average values of main experts and average values of remained group of experts. 
For the operators who acquire the ET data, the order of decision tree headings was determined 
as the average of PSF orders of the entire group. PSF probabilities were calculated also as average 
values of the entire group of experts. 
An anchor probability value was selected as 0,03—a conservative value accepted by all experts 
of human analysis. 
As a result, we developed three decision trees with many branches. Due to the large sizes of 
decision trees developed, we present just a fragment of the decision tree developed according to our 
first approach (indicated above) as Figure 2. 
In  our  case,  a  simplified model  was  developed  for a  decision tree  in  which all PSFs  were 
assigned as factors with equivalent weight. For more in-depth analysis of human factor, usually it is 
specified weight coefficients for each heading according to expert judgments. 
  
 
 
Figure 2 - Fragment of decision tree for calculation of operator-analyst HEP (decision tree was 
developed based on one main expert judgment) 
 
 
In the final stage of using the decision tree methodology, final tables were prepared to calculate 
human error reliability, taking into account all risk-essential factors. These tables are presented as 
Tables  1,  2,  and  3.  The  HEP  is  calculated  as  a  multiplication  of  anchor  probability  value  and 
quantitative  assessments  of  each  PSF.  For  example,  five  different  possibilities  for  calculating  the 
probabilities of five different operators for each case have been considered. 
In a case of more in-depth analysis of human factor, each value also is multiplied by the weight 
coefficients specified. 
Taking  into  account  that  the  human  factor  of  ET  consists  of  human  factor  of  personnel 
acquiring ET data and human factor of personnel interpreting ET results, the resulting HEP will be the 
following: 
analyz data acq ET HEP HEP HEP + = _ . 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we examined the application of HEP to ET for steam generator tubes, to quantify the 
human factor and to assess its effect on NDT results reliability. 
This work resulted in two different assessments of HEP. In the case of ASEP, a conservative 
estimate  was  obtained.  This  methodology  does  not  take  into  account  specific  details  of  ET 
performance.  
Table 1 - Resulting table of decision tree for calculation of operator-analyst HEP (decision tree was 
developed based on one main expert judgment) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Resulting table of decision tree for calculation of operator-analyst HEP (decision tree was 
developed based on three main experts’ judgment) 
 
 
 
 
In the case of the decision tree, we obtained essentially smaller values. This approach takes into 
account not only features and factors of the ET method but the ET system as well (according to 
definition  that  ET  system  includes  equipment  and  personnel  performing  inspection  with  this 
equipment). With the application of decision trees developed, it is possible to calculate HEP for each 
operator based on his personal possibilities. 
After analysis of HEP values, we may propose to select as a basic HEP for ASEP and anchor 
probability value for decision tree higher than 0,03. Reason for this suggestion: it is assumed to use 
0,03  as  basic  HEP  and  anchor  probability  value  for  HRA  of  NPP  operations  personnel,  but 
maintenance staff is subject of our research. Based on that, a new approach to derive basic HEP for 
ASEP and anchor probability value should be considered.  
Table 3 - Resulting table of decision tree for calculation of HEP of operators who acquire ET data 
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